| 单词 | central bank independence |
| 释义 | central bank independence Independence of the central bank from immediate short-run control of its aims and operations by the government. This can be promoted by removing the government's right to sack the central bank's directors or to dictate its policies. An independent central bank is desired by those who believe stable money is good for the economy. This may sometimes conflict with government aims, whether these are increased employment or the protection of various vested interests in the economy. Governments are believed to be too easily tempted on short-run grounds into inflationary policies, through attempts to boost employment, or inability to resist groups lobbying for higher state spending and lower taxes. Thus, a central bank under the immediate control of politicians is liable to adopt monetary policies which lead to inflation, or to fail to use monetary policy sufficiently vigorously to resist inflation. An independent central bank is expected to be better for monetary stability for two reasons. First, it can be legally committed to promoting monetary stability; and second, bankers are expected to favour price stability, since so many bank assets are denominated in money terms. In the long run central banks cannot be completely independent of politics: the banking system is part of a country's overall political structure. If central bank independence is enshrined in law, this can be changed; even if it is written into the constitution, constitutions can be and often have been amended. |
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